Using regulation to limit salt intake and prevent noncommunicable diseases: lessons from South Africa’s experience by Kaldor, JC et al.
Using regulation to limit salt intake and prevent non-
communicable diseases: lessons from South Africa’s experience
Jenny Claire Kaldor1,*, Anne Marie Thow2 and Hettie Schönfeldt3,4
1Sydney Law School, The University of Sydney, Law School Building (F10), Eastern Avenue, Camperdown, NSW
2006, Australia: 2Menzies Centre for Health Policy, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia: 3Institute of
Food, Nutrition and Well-being, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa: 4Department of Animal and Wildlife
Sciences, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
Submitted 31 March 2018: Final revision received 7 September 2018: Accepted 12 October 2018: First published online 27 December 2018
Abstract
Objective: To analyse the policy process for the South African regulation setting
upper limits for salt in thirteen commonly consumed food categories, to inform
future policy action for prevention of non-communicable diseases.
Design: Semi-structured interviews (n 10) were conducted with key stakeholders
from government, academia, non-governmental organisations and the food
industry. Interviewees were asked about the content, context, process and actors
involved in developing the regulation. Data were analysed according to Walt and
Gilson’s health policy analysis triangle.
Setting: South Africa.
Participants: Key actors and stakeholders in the policy process to develop the salt
regulation.
Results: The regulation was a response to research establishing the effectiveness
of food supply interventions and to a shared perception that government
regulation was the quickest way to address the problem of salt overconsumption.
While the regulationswere developed through a consultative process, food industry
stakeholders perceived the consultation as inadequate. Implementation is currently
underway, supported by a health promotion programme. Monitoring and
enforcement were identified as the most likely challenges due to capacity
constraints.
Conclusions: Comprehensive mandatory salt limits are an innovative approach to
food reformulation. Factors that enabled regulation included robust scientific
evidence, strong political and bureaucratic leadership, and the pragmatic use of
existing regulatory instruments. The main challenges identified were disagreement
over the appropriate nature and extent of food industry participation, and
monitoring and enforcement challenges due to capacity constraints.
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Non-communicable diseases (NCD) are now the leading
cause of mortality worldwide and represent a major public
health challenge(1). These include CVD, diabetes, cancer
and chronic respiratory diseases, which share four
underlying modifiable risk factors: tobacco use, the
harmful use of alcohol, physical inactivity and unhealthy
diets. Unhealthy diets are high in sodium/salt, sugar, fats
(especially trans and saturated fats) and overall energy,
and low in fruit, vegetables, fibre and whole grains(2).
There is global commitment to introducing policies to
improve consumers’ ability to make healthier choices and
to make the composition of the food supply healthier
(reformulation)(3,4). Reformulation refers to changing the
composition of processed foods to make them healthier:
usually, reducing their salt, sugar or fat content, and/or
their overall energy density(5). The WHO has endorsed
reformulation as a strategy to reduce consumption of salt,
saturated fats and trans fats(3). However, although refor-
mulation is a clear policy goal, questions remain as to the
best way of achieving it(6,7).
In terms of policy options, the choice is usually pre-
sented as ‘voluntary’ v. ‘mandatory’ reformulation(8). Both
approaches tend to be government-led, but mandatory
reformulation involves the use of law while ‘voluntary’
refers to companies taking action that is encouraged,
assisted or overseen by government. To date, govern-
ments around the world have preferred voluntary
approaches to reformulation(9,10), occupying a broad
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regulatory spectrum from platforms for stakeholder dia-
logue to public–private partnerships(11,12). A good exam-
ple of the latter was the UK’s successful efforts to reduce
salt in the food supply during 2003–2011, usually descri-
bed as a government-led, voluntary scheme(13,14). How-
ever, voluntary reformulation is criticised by public health
and regulatory experts who argue that, without stronger
government oversight, progress is slow or ineffective, and
genuine food supply change hampered by conflicts of
interest(15–21). Mandatory reformulation, they argue, would
be the more effective approach(8,22).
Mandatory reformulation tends to be implemented
through government laws or regulations specifying per-
missible upper limits of particular nutrients or ingredients
in particular foods(23). Over the past two decades, the
number of jurisdictions implementing such regulations
(‘mandatory nutrient limits’) has grown significantly, to
twenty-four(24). Mandatory limits have been effective in
reducing trans fats in the food supply(25), prompting calls
for similar mandatory approaches to be used for other
NCD-associated nutrients, including salt(26,27). However,
while eleven jurisdictions have implemented mandatory
salt limits, to date these have not applied across the food
supply but only to individual food categories.
High salt intake is a risk factor for hypertension and
CVD, causing an estimated 1·7 million deaths worldwide
in 2010(1). The WHO estimates the current global average
salt intake to be 10 g/person per d but recommends a
daily intake of no more than 5 g/person per d (approxi-
mately 2 g Na/d)(28). Salt is added to food in three main
ways: during food processing, during food preparation
and at the table. In 2013, South Africa and Argentina
became the first jurisdictions to set mandatory limits for
salt across a broad range of commonly consumed
foods(9). In the present paper, we document the policy
process in South Africa as a case study of the develop-
ment and implementation of mandatory salt limits. Given
increasing interest in the use of mandatory nutrient limits
for NCD prevention, there is scope for other jurisdictions
to learn from South Africa’s experience. The paper
aims to inform global understanding of the development
and implementation of innovative regulation for diet-
related disease, for countries wishing to take a similar
approach.
The Republic of South Africa is a representative
democracy and an ‘upper middle income’ country(29). The
population experiences wide disparities in socio-
economic and health status(30). South Africa is described
as having a ‘quadruple burden of disease’, with NCD
occurring alongside infectious diseases, maternal and child
mortality, and trauma(31). In 2010, 38·9% of deaths were
attributable to NCD(32) and the prevalence of hypertension
in South Africa is 31% for men and 36% for women, with
the prevalence in men doubling between 1998 and
2008(31,33). The cause of this increase is multifactorial and
includes the shift away from traditional staple foods and
increasingly towards processed foods high in salt, char-
acteristic of the nutrition transition(34,35).
Methods
Theoretical framework
We analysed the development and enactment of the
mandatory salt limits in South Africa using case study
research methodology informed by regulatory studies and
policy analysis frameworks(36–38). In particular, we drew
on Walt and Gilson’s health policy analysis triangle, which
provides an analytical framework for the collection and
analysis of qualitative data related to policy development
and reform(39,40). Its components are the content, context
and process of the policy (the apices of the triangle) and
the actors involved (in the centre of the triangle). Into this
framework we also incorporated considerations from the
field of regulatory studies. This field provides insights into
different regulatory forms (i.e. relevant to policy content),
for instance traditional ‘command-and-control’ govern-
ment regulation compared with voluntary or co-regulatory
approaches(41–43). This is important because of the
increasing involvement of non-governmental actors in
the food and public health policy arena, traditionally the
domain of the state(44). In addition, given the global con-
text of diet-related NCD policy and the important role of
inter-jurisdictional policy learning in this space(1), we
considered theories of policy learning, including the
framing of the problem and the role played by
institutions(45–47).
Data collection and analysis
During March 2015, we reviewed the regulation and
conducted interviews with stakeholders in Pretoria,
Johannesburg and Cape Town (the three official cities of
government in South Africa). We identified stakeholders to
interview by mapping the key institutional actors involved
in the policy process in South Africa, and by conducting
informal or backgrounding interviews on the policy
landscape for the salt regulation. Based on this, we sent
letters of invitation to key policy makers, as well as
members of two working groups, with relevance to the salt
regulation. Initially, twelve interviews were requested;
three people declined or were unavailable (one each
from the industry, government and academic sectors). We
gained additional interviewees through snowball sampling
during interviews and completed interviews when no
further potential interviewees were identified by
participants.
We conducted ten interviews with stakeholders falling
into four sectors: government (n 3), academia (n 2), the
food industry (n 3) and non-governmental organisations
(NGO; n 2). All interviewees gave their written consent to
be interviewed. The majority of the interviews were audio-
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recorded and transcribed later. In two cases, the inter-
views were not audio-recorded at the interviewees’
request.
The interviews were semi-structured, with questions
based on our theoretical frameworks. Specifically, ques-
tions included:
∙ Who initiated the regulations?
∙ How did the regulation get on the policy agenda?
∙ Were different policy options considered? Which ones?
Why were these not pursued?
∙ Were international precedents considered?
∙ Once regulation was on the agenda, what did the
development process involve? Who did it involve?
∙ How were the technical aspects (e.g. specific salt
reduction targets) of the regulation determined?
∙ What are the benefits of the regulation? What are its
burdens?
∙ Was the decision to legislate controversial? How was the
issue framed in the media and other public discourse?
These questions were piloted in three backgrounding
interviews, to assess the appropriateness of the questions
asked. J.C.K. conducted all interviews, with H.S. in atten-
dance for four of these. J.C.K. took detailed notes
throughout all interviews and transcribed them immedi-
ately afterwards. We also asked the interviewees to pro-
vide relevant documentation to support or provide
background for particular points made during the inter-
view. This process yielded ‘grey’ literature including policy
documents, research reports, briefs from advocacy orga-
nisations, and publicly available data such as the South
African census information. We drew on this to triangulate
our interview findings with respect to policy context,
actors and process.
The data were analysed qualitatively, using the theore-
tical frameworks to guide hand-coding of the interview
transcripts and extraction of relevant data from docu-
ments. J.C.K. led the analysis, which was reviewed and
refined by A.M.T. and H.S. The coded data were used to
construct a detailed narrative of the policy process, as well
as to identify the actors and contextual factors that had
shaped decision making and policy content, with refer-
ence to potential for policy learning in other jurisdictions.
The Human Research Ethics Committee of the University
of Sydney, Australia, approved the study (project number
2014/1000).
Results
Policy content
South Africa’s mandatory salt limits were implemented via
the ‘Regulations relating to the reduction of sodium in
certain foodstuffs and related matters’, Regulation No. 214
under the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disinfectants Act
1972 (hereafter, ‘the Regulation’). The Regulation was
signed into law in March 2013 by the national Minister of
Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi. It covers thirteen product
categories, which were required to comply with a first
sodium limit by 30 June 2016, followed by a lower sodium
limit by 30 June 2019 (Table 1). The Regulation also spe-
cifies two different methodologies for testing the amount
of sodium in food: one for bread and another for all other
products. The Regulation is purely technical in nature and
does not mention hypertension, stroke or heart disease, or
provide any other context.
Context
As Walt and Gilson emphasise, the historical and country-
specific context in which policy is developed is a critical
factor shaping the outcome of that policy(39,40,48).
Table 1 Extract from ‘Regulations relating to the reduction of
sodium in certain foodstuffs and related matters’ (adapted from
South African Government, 2013(77))
Foodstuff category
Maximum total
Na per 100 g
foodstuff (mg)
Dates on which the
total sodium reduction
becomes effective
Bread 400 30 June 2016
380 30 June 2019
All breakfast cereals and
porridges, whether
ready-to-eat, instant
or cook-up, hot or cold
500 30 June 2016
400 30 June 2019
All fat spreads and butter
spreads
550 30 June 2016
450 30 June 2019
Ready-to-eat savoury
snacks, excluding
salt-and-vinegar
flavoured savoury
snacks
800 30 June 2016
700 30 June 2019
Flavoured potato crisps,
excluding salt-and-
vinegar flavoured
potato crisps
650 30 June 2016
550 30 June 2019
Flavoured, ready-to-eat,
savoury snacks and
potato crisps – salt-
and-vinegar only
1000 30 June 2016
850 30 June 2019
Processed meat (cured) 1300 31 March 2017
1150 30 June 2019
Processed meat
(uncured)
850 30 June 2016
650 30 June 2019
Raw-processed meat
sausages (all types)
and similar products
800 30 June 2016
600 30 June 2019
Dry soup powder (not
the instant type)
5500 30 June 2016
3500 30 June 2019
Dry soup powders and
dry instant savoury
sauces
3500 30 June 2016
1500 30 June 2019
Dry savoury powders
with dry instant
noodles to be mixed
with a liquid
1500 30 June 2016
800 30 June 2019
Stock cubes, stock
powders, stock
granules, stock
emulsions, stock
pastes or stock jellies
18 000 30 June 2016
13 000 30 June 2019
1318 JC Kaldor et al.
According to the interviewees, national as well as inter-
national factors provided the context for the Regulation.
All interviewees described high and growing national rates
of hypertension. They described the potent interaction
between high dietary salt intakes and the genetic salt
sensitivity of black South Africans (who make up 79·6% of
the population(49,50)). Some interviewees noted that
hypertension was a relatively new policy focus for South
Africa, following decades of attention on infectious dis-
eases (especially HIV) and undernutrition. Several inter-
viewees made reference to the food selection constraints
experienced by people on low incomes, with cost, rather
than nutrition, being the main consideration. Low-income
populations thus consume a limited diet, heavy in starch –
particularly refined white maize meal and brown bread.
Interviewees also noted that cheap processed foods ten-
ded to be high in salt and that added salt was often the
only thing that made such food flavoursome.
Interviewees noted that the national food-based dietary
guidelines include the advice to ‘use salt sparingly’. The
guidelines have been in place since 2001, and this advice
has since been updated to ‘use salt and foods high in salt
sparingly’(51). However, some interviewees expressed
scepticism about the impact of the food-based dietary
guidelines on the behaviour of either the food industry or
individual citizens. On the contrary, they mentioned cul-
tural beliefs and practices that ascribe positive character-
istics to salt and which might therefore undermine official
dietary advice. One interviewee stated: ‘Culturally, salt is
considered to be wealth … if you don’t have salt in the
home, then you have a real problem.’
Interviewees in all stakeholder groups gave evidence
that the international context, in which momentum on
NCD was growing, was an influence on South Africa’s
national NCD policy. They suggested that while national
epidemiological trends may have provided the context for
action, international political factors explain the speed and
forcefulness of that action. In September 2011, which
according to interviewees was a critical time in the policy
development stage, the UN General Assembly held its
high-level meeting on the Prevention and Control of Non-
communicable Diseases (19–20 September 2011). In the
lead-up to that meeting, the South African health minister
had attended domestic and international summits on NCD
and their prevention through policy. This international
policy context contributed to a sense of urgency and a
sense that action needed to be both swift and visible.
Process
If context explains why South Africa considered hyper-
tension to be a priority problem, then process relates to
how it came to be addressed in this specific way, i.e.
regulating salt in processed foods. We focus on three
phases of the policy process: agenda setting, development
and implementation.
Agenda setting
Agenda setting refers to ‘the issue sorting stage during
which a small number of the many problems societies face
rise to the attention of decision-makers’(40). We found two
important factors that combined to get this particular
policy option on the decision makers’ agenda. First, new
research findings by academics were presented to the
Department of Health (DoH) in 2010, establishing the
effectiveness of food supply interventions (i.e. the ‘what’
of this policy intervention). Second, there was a wide-
spread perception among stakeholders that government
regulation (and not self-regulation) would be the quickest
and most effective way of addressing the identified pro-
blem (i.e. the ‘how’ of this policy intervention).
Establishing policy-relevant evidence was the first step
in the agenda-setting phase. Many interviewees explained
that the data linking salt consumption and hypertension
are very complex and were in many cases unavailable for
South Africa until recently. Interviewees stressed that
multiple types of data were necessary to build the case for
government intervention, as summarised in Table 2.
Together, these data acted as links in an evidentiary chain
that provided impetus for action. Among these, inter-
viewees identified an intervention study by Charlton
et al.(52) as one of the most important links in the chain.
They noted that Charlton and colleagues had demon-
strated that adjusting the salt content of commonly con-
sumed foods with high levels of salt could shift salt
consumption in the study population.
Academic interviewees described the process of meet-
ing with the DoH bureaucrats and explaining to them the
significance of this research. Once they heard and
understood the researchers’ message, in 2010, it seems
that the bureaucrats moved quickly from evidence to
action. Having ‘bought in’ to the idea of a food supply-
based intervention, the DoH bureaucrats secured the
support of the Minister of Health and ultimately drove the
regulatory agenda (discussed further under ‘Development’
below).
Development
Once the DoH decided to take action, it considered two
main policy options: government regulation and industry
Table 2 Links in the evidentiary chain: different types of scientific
evidence that contributed to regulatory action on salt in
South Africa
∙ Evidence of the amount of salt consumed across South Africa,
and within different population groups. Evidence of how salt was
consumed (i.e. in processed foods or as discretionary salt).
Evidence of which foods contributed to greatest salt intake(78)
∙ Food composition tables, showing the natural salt content of
commonly-consumed foods
∙ Epidemiological data showing rates of hypertension
∙ Intervention studies (i.e. evidence that reducing salt consumption
can reduce hypertension, such as the study by Charlton et al.(52))
∙ Health economic data about the relative cost of different
interventions
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self-regulation (also described as ‘voluntary’ measures).
However, government regulation was the preferred
approach because of a widespread perception that it was
the more effective option. Regardless of whether they
supported government regulation or not, government and
industry interviewees alike characterised it as the stronger,
‘tough’ or ‘hard-hitting’ option, which would yield results
faster. The need for strong action was seen to be necessary
for a variety of reasons. Some interviewees pointed to the
diverse and uncoordinated nature of the South African
food industry, with a high proportion of small and medium
enterprises. These companies were perceived to be less
likely to implement voluntary industry norms; as one
person said, ‘the companies operate on their own and they
will do their own thing.’ Others were suspicious that,
under self-regulatory conditions, industry would make
only minimal changes to salt levels. Further, the need for
speedy action was explained by the international political
context described above.
Interviews gave evidence that ‘nanny state’ debates, and
concerns about the paternalistic nature of the regulation,
were not an influential aspect of the issue’s framing.
Rather, interviewees across the groups stressed the more
positive attributes of regulation, particularly its power to
address the social determinants of high salt consumption.
They argued that regulation could reach the whole
population and create healthier environments, because it
does not rely on individual behaviour change. As one
NGO interviewee explained:
‘By legislating it … you’re doing it already for the
consumer: it’s already done. Dietary guidelines, all
of those [kinds of policies], leave it up to the indi-
viduals to make the changes, a lifestyle change. But
the legislation forces it, it happens, that’s it. And it’s
going to have an impact across the board.’
In 2010, the DoH began consulting with different stake-
holders, including the food industry. We found the
highest amount of disagreement among interviewees in
relation to this part of the policy process. The main point
of contention was whether or not the DoH had engaged in
a truly consultative process. Industry interviewees felt that
the outcome (i.e. regulation) was predetermined and the
process too hasty. By contrast, government, NGO and
academic interviewees all described the process as highly
consultative.
The industry interviewees had all been involved in
policy discussions from an early stage. They shared a
common perception with the government interviewees
that regulation was always an option if industry failed to
take action on salt of its own accord. However, industry
believed that this option of last resort was triggered too
swiftly, and without adequate consultation or explanation.
They felt they had been ambushed by regulation,
describing a situation in which regulation quickly went
from being only one of several options under
consideration, to suddenly being rushed through. One
industry interviewee stated: ‘One moment we’re still
brainstorming and the next moment, there’s a regulation!’
Another said: ‘The Minister signed off the new regulations,
in the middle of a consultative process! … Everybody
thought that we were going to have another round or two
of consultation, but that didn’t happen.’
In contrast, government interviewees believed that they
had engaged in a consultative process – but only to the
extent necessary or appropriate. A senior DoH bureaucrat
stated:
‘We certainly realised that the industry were key
players in this. But I wouldn’t imagine that I would
have called the industry until I had some ideas, first,
about what we might want to do, and how we might
want to engage with them. And we probably would
have spoken to a couple of other stakeholders first,
who had much more of a health interest in this, than
a profit interest. And I think that that’s quite legit-
imate, because we are a Health Department, and we
need to look at how best to improve health.’
Government and NGO interviewees felt that industry
had already had plenty of time to self-regulate but had
failed to act. One pointed out that South Africa had had
food-based dietary guidelines for 15 years, with no impact
on food industry practices and food composition. Gov-
ernment interviewees felt that while regulation was not
their first option, industry was not ‘coming to the table’ on
health, and so they were left with no alternative but to
regulate. Furthermore, government and NGO interviewees
gave evidence that, far from being ambushed, food com-
panies had in fact requested regulation at the outset of
discussions, to ensure a ‘level playing field’ across the
industry. Industry interviewees agreed that they were
initially in favour of regulatory action but were unplea-
santly surprised by what they perceived as tough limits
and tight timelines in the draft Regulation, and subse-
quently became less supportive. Matters progressed
swiftly between 2010 (when discussions began) and 2011
(when the Minister gave his support)
Once the course of action was confirmed, a senior
bureaucrat within the Food Control Directorate of the
South African DoH drafted the Regulation. As one gov-
ernment interviewee explained, it was simpler and quicker
to implement the salt limits as regulations (i.e. delegated
legislation) than to draft a new piece of legislation: it was a
‘low-hanging fruit’. A draft Regulation was published in the
government gazette in July 2012, with a three-month
comment period(53). During that time, government
received submissions from at least twenty food industry
companies and organisations. Food industry interviewees
also stated that a ‘pre-draft’ was made available to them
before the gazetted draft, as a courtesy. The main changes
made between the draft and the final Regulation were that
the later deadline was pushed back from 2018 to 2019, and
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there was some refinement of the food categories and
testing methodologies.
Implementation
The Regulation was signed into law in March 2013, with
the first salt reduction milestone at June 2016 and a sub-
sequent one three years later. At the time of our inter-
views, industry stakeholders indicated that the milestones
were technically feasible and that they were well on their
way to achieving them, albeit with some cost as they had
to make adjustments to machinery and ingredients.
However, they predicted that the greatest threat to the
effectiveness of the Regulation would be staffing and
resource constraints for monitoring and enforcement.
Separate from the Regulation, but supporting its imple-
mentation, a public awareness campaign called Salt
Watch, led by the Heart and Stroke Foundation South
Africa (an NGO), was launched to educate the population
on the benefits of consuming less salt.
Like all health legislation in South Africa, the Regulation
was set at the national level but will be enforced at the
municipal level by local environmental health officers.
Interviewees were concerned that the number and capa-
city of environmental health officers were limited, and that
they shared laboratory space with forensic investigators,
whose tests might take precedence. Furthermore, there is
no single food regulator in South Africa. Several different
bodies are involved: the DoH, the Department of Agri-
culture, Fisheries and Forestry, and the National Con-
sumer Commission, each administering some food-related
legislation, while two further standards setting agencies
are responsible for food standards. Interviewees expres-
sed concern that, as a result of this complexity, monitoring
and enforcement of the Regulation would fall to compa-
nies monitoring one another and informing the autho-
rities. Industry interviewees expressed frustration that this
was essentially self-regulation by another name, with
companies bearing the cost of monitoring in addition to
implementation. They were concerned that the impact of
such de facto self-regulation would be that big food
companies would comply, while smaller operators
ignored the new regulations and carried on business
as usual.
Interviewees in all groups commented that, alongside
the Regulation, health promotion and education would be
vital to salt reduction in South Africa due to the high intake
of discretionary salt (40%). Although not part of the Reg-
ulation, interviewees regarded the Salt Watch campaign as
being a key part of its implementation. This was due to a
widely held view that, without education, people might
simply add salt back in to salt-reduced products: ‘Because
even though there’s legislation, without education, and
getting discretionary salt down, you’re not going to get
impact. … You’ve got to shift cultural beliefs by educating
people.’
Actors
Interviewees gave evidence that the regulation was
developed by a small and tight-knit policy community and
was championed by a few key individuals. Stakeholders
were in frequent contact and often ‘wore many hats’, i.e.
they held many different roles simultaneously. Inter-
viewees referred to each other by their first names, and
many had moved between sectors during their careers.
Many were members of the same handful of groups or
institutions that were key to the Regulation. These inclu-
ded the Food Legislation Advisory Group (an informal
body consisting of professional bodies and experts that
consults to the Food Control Directorate within DoH) and
the steering committee for Salt Watch. As such, many of
the same people had been involved at all stages of the
policy process, from formulating the regulations to
implementing the health promotion campaign.
Interviewees pointed to the important leadership of
particular individuals during the policy process. The
Minister of Health and the top NCD bureaucrat were both
portrayed as ‘powerful’, ‘bold’ ‘champions’ with ‘vision’ (as
well as inflexible, ‘dogmatic’ and on a ‘crusade’). Their
persistence was seen as a critical in the Regulation’s
enactment. Another senior bureaucrat, within the Food
Control Directorate, was repeatedly identified as the
technical specialist who had designed the Regulation, as
well as being the main gatekeeper of its interpretation and
applicability to various foodstuffs. Many stakeholders also
described the significant impact of an international public
health expert, who had visited South Africa at least twice
during the policy development process. Interviewees held
mixed views towards this international expert: some
commented on the value of international expertise, while
others expressed concern about the influence of an
international actor in the domestic policy space.
Discussion
The findings above suggest a high level of consensus
among stakeholders that government regulation was the
toughest and most effective approach to reducing salt
consumption. Political and bureaucratic leadership, the
international NCD policy environment, as well as robust
scientific evidence, also played an important role in get-
ting the Regulation enacted. Although the Regulation was
developed in a consultative process, food industry stake-
holders perceived this to be inadequate. Implementation is
currently underway, supported by a health promotion
programme, and stakeholders predict that monitoring and
enforcement will be the most likely barriers to success.
Early analyses of the impact of the Regulation suggest
that South Africa’s mandatory salt limits are incentivising
reformulation. Recent data suggest that two-thirds of foods
covered by the Regulation have already met the limit
during early stages of policy implementation, and that
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‘only moderate reductions in sodium content will be
required to bring many of the currently products in line
with the regulation’(54). This effectiveness evidence is
necessary, but not sufficient, to influence policy change in
other jurisdictions. Because politics is core to policy
making(47), understanding the policy process can enable
other jurisdictions to move from evidence to action. The
findings of the present study can inform public health
advocacy and policy making in other jurisdictions wishing
to implement a similar regulatory approach to population
salt reduction.
Learning from South Africa’s innovative
regulation for diet-related non-communicable
diseases
Drawing on theories of the policy process and regulatory
theory, our findings highlight five potential lessons for
other jurisdictions regarding the agenda setting and policy
development processes undertaken in South Africa. In
particular, these relate to: (i) considering existing policy
tools in the design of the new policy measure; (ii) framing
the use of strong policy tools in a positive way; (iii)
coordinating the advocacy of public health actors; (iv)
managing appropriate consultation and engagement with
industry actors in the design of public health nutrition
policy measures; and (v) ensuring enforcement capacity.
With respect to policy design, a key feature of the South
African regulation was the pragmatic use of an existing
policy instrument (the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics and Disin-
fectants Act 1972) to implement the intervention. Once a
mandatory approach to salt reduction was decided upon,
the choice to implement it using regulations, rather than
legislation, was a significant enabler. Regulations tend to
be more flexible than legislation and allow for drafting
decisions to be made by those with technical expertise,
rather than elected politicians. For this reason, they are
particularly useful in policy areas where specifications are
detailed and frequently changing, including food and
health(55,56).
This meant that the development and passage of the
Regulation was straightforward from a technical perspec-
tive, but also politically achievable. This was further
reflected in what we found to be a lack of explicit framing
of the Regulation as a ‘nanny state’ intervention. This
finding was in direct contrast to way such regulations tend
to be framed in the literature, where mandatory nutrient
limits have been described as ‘highly paternalistic’(57),
‘controversial’(58), ‘the most far-reaching form of limiting
choice’(59) and ‘some of the most contentious public health
laws’(60). Framing is core to policy agenda setting, and
effective frames can contribute to the opening of
‘windows’ for policy change(61,62). In South Africa, the
Regulation was framed as a strong and effective response
to a situation requiring urgent action. It was clear from the
interviews that the availability of local evidence under-
pinning this frame was powerful, as it: (i) demonstrated
the high burden of hypertension; (ii) located the
problem in the food supply, rather than in individuals (i.e.
extremely high, and unnecessary, levels of salt in staple
foods); and (iii) emphasised the limitations (education,
poverty) faced by consumers in choosing ‘healthier’ diets,
tying into a context of entrenched disadvantage in South
Africa.
The NGO-led Salt Watch campaign created a platform
for stakeholder coordination on salt as a public health
issue. This helped to create a unified frame: (i) that salt
was a policy issue; and (ii) that it required strong and
urgent action. This reflected the role of strong ‘advocacy
coalitions’ in supporting policy change(63,64). In particular,
this non-government platform created an opportunity for
research evidence to inform advocacy, and the inclusion
of food industry actors and bureaucrats on the board
meant that all key stakeholders were familiar with the
evidence for the problem of high salt intakes and policy
options to address it, before the issue formally became the
subject of policy discussion.
The work of Salt Watch and the local evidence for the
severity of the problem were further supported by an
institutional shift at the global level. In 2011, action on
NCD became a focal area for the UN General Assembly
(attended by the President), in addition to the World
Health Assembly (attended by the Minister for Health). In
the South African context, strong action on salt afforded an
opportunity for the newly re-elected government to
demonstrate commitment to tackling the high burden of
NCD on the global stage. The leading NCD bureaucrat
acted as a policy entrepreneur(62), while the Minister was a
political champion for strong action on salt. Strong political
leadership has been identified as a critical element of
successful national innovation on NCD(67). In particular,
the Minister’s strong support gave the DoH confidence
and the political capital it needed to implement the
Regulation.
The present case study also highlights the fundamen-
tally different beliefs of actors in different sectors about the
appropriate role for industry in the development of
nutrition policy. From the DoH’s perspective, the purpose
of consultation seemed to be to gain industry buy-in once
regulation was already on the cards. By contrast, industry
members believed that the purpose of consultation was to
determine whether or not to pursue regulation at all. This
contributed to a perception by some industry stakeholders
that the outcome (i.e. regulation) was pre-ordained, and
the process was not truly consultative. This speaks to a
broader policy debate about whether, when, how and to
what extent the food industry should have a seat at the
table on nutrition policy. In relation to tobacco, the WHO
is unequivocal that industry should play no role at any
stage of the tobacco policy process(66). However, in
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relation to food, the WHO has consistently used the lan-
guage of ‘responsible partnership’ with industry(67–69). And
while some public health experts have stated that the food
industry ‘should have no role in the formation of national
or international policy for non-communicable diseases’(70),
implementation is another matter. On this front, many
would agree that the industry – as the producer of the food
supply – does need to be part of the solution(71,72).
Our findings suggest that while South Africa took
appropriate steps to manage any potential conflict of
interest, disparities between the perceptions of different
stakeholders remained. A lesson for future policy making,
therefore, is the importance of setting parameters, mana-
ging expectations, and clarifying early the precise nature
and extent of industry’s involvement. There is an impor-
tant balance to be struck and guidance from the WHO
Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors may
help countries to navigate this(73).
Finally, the interviews revealed potential challenges for
monitoring and enforcement, due to capacity limitations.
As Burris and colleagues have argued, enacting a new law
or regulation is only the first step of innovative public
health regulation(74,75). Implementation, monitoring,
enforcement and analysis (especially useful for inter-
jurisdictional policy learning) should be regarded as part
of the process. For example, evaluating the success of the
Regulation in achieving its goals – i.e. reducing dietary salt
intake and hypertension – will be essential to policy
learning. The case of South Africa suggests the need for
policy makers to be aware of the need to consider, and
build capacity for, these later steps at the same time that
new regulatory interventions are being developed and
implemented.
Challenges and limitations
The present study had two limitations, one relating to the
interviewees and another to the timing of the research.
First, certain key actors were not available to be inter-
viewed, or were not able to be identified. As such, some
important perspectives are likely to be missing. For
example, the food industry interviewees all came from
what might be described as Big Food, i.e. large corpora-
tions and trade organisations. These actors are well orga-
nised and well resourced, and thus may be able to
implement the changes required by regulation more easily
than smaller industry actors.
The second limitation of our research related to its
timing. The interviews were conducted at a time when the
Regulation had been passed but had not yet come into
force. Industry interviewees were at an early stage of
determining whether the salt limits and timelines would be
feasible, and so could not report on that issue with cer-
tainty. Moreover, the lower limit does not come into force
until 2019, so none of the interviewees could comment on
the effectiveness of the Regulation.
Conclusion
Worldwide, there is growing interest in the use of legal
and regulatory measures to improve the composition of
the food supply and tackle diet-related NCD(76). Manda-
tory nutrient limits are one such option, and South Africa
has been a recent innovator on this front. While it is too
early to assess its impact on population health outcomes,
policy makers and the international public health com-
munity can learn from South Africa’s experience of
developing this policy. We reviewed the Regulation and
conducted interviews with key stakeholders to the Reg-
ulation, representing the government, academia, food
industry and NGO sectors. We analysed these data
according to the health policy analysis triangle and reg-
ulatory theory, examining content, context, process and
the actors involved. This systematic framework allowed us
to identify lessons for other jurisdictions seeking to
implement similar measures. Our findings suggest that
jurisdictions should consider existing regulatory instru-
ments when implementing otherwise-innovative policies,
and should make a strong, positive case for the use of such
instruments. Countries should also be alert to the need to
manage stakeholder expectations around participation in
policy development. Given the increasing interest in
mandatory nutrient limits, there may also be a need for
high-level policy guidance (e.g. from the WHO) on food
industry participation in policy processes.
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